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INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
Abstract 
We review and integrate a wide range of literature that has examined the strategies by which 
organizations navigate institutionally diverse settings and capture rents outside of the 
marketplace. We synthesize this body of research under the umbrella term institutional 
strategies, which we define as the comprehensive set of plans and actions directed at 
strategically leveraging and shaping the socio-political and cultural institutions within an 
organization’s external environment. Our review of institutional strategies is focused on 
emerging market contexts, settings that are characterized by weak capital market and regulatory 
infrastructures and fast-paced turbulent change. Under such challenging conditions, strategies 
aimed at shaping the institutional environment may be especially critical to an organization’s 
performance and long-term survival. Our review reveals that organizations engage in three 
specific and identifiable sets of institutional strategies, which we term: relational, infrastructure-
building, and socio-cultural bridging. We conclude by highlighting fruitful avenues for cross-
disciplinary dialogue in the hope of promoting future research on emerging markets and defining 
the next frontier of institutional theory in organizational analysis.  
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INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
In an increasingly complex and integrated global economy, a significant challenge for 
organizations is navigating institutionally diverse contexts – each posing a different set of 
opportunities and challenges.  Scholars over the past decades have articulated the multifaceted 
influence of institutions on organizations and competition, with some traditions foregrounding 
formal and legal aspects	(Hall, 1986; North, 1990; Williamson, 2000)	while others focusing more 
on informal and socio-cultural aspects (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).   
North (1991: 87) defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction.” For Scott (2014: 56), institutions are the “regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life.” While extensive research has focused on the effects 
of institutional variation on organizations (Peng et al., 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011), less 
attention has been paid to examining the ways in which organizations purposefully and 
strategically shape their institutional environment.  Yet, as recent research has begun 
documenting, the effective management of socio-political and cultural institutions is no less 
important to organizational survival than marketplace success (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lounsbury 
& Glynn , 2001; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Seelos & Mair, 2007). 	
In this paper, we review and integrate recent literatures that have documented a variety of 
strategies by which organizations attend to institutionally diverse settings and capture rents 
outside of the marketplace, including strategies that seek to influence the public policy arena and 
benefit from the non-market environment  (Henisz & Zelner, 2003; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 
2004; Kozhikode & Li, 2012), to transform institutions (Campbell, 1998; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; 
Lawrence, 1999), and to engage with key stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984; Galaskiewicz, 			
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1985; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). While these efforts have shed light on the complexity of 
organizational behaviors, our understanding of the diversity and contextual relevance of different 
types of institutional strategies remains balkanized and selective. 
 We focus our review of institutional strategies on emerging market economies – broadly 
defined as countries undergoing fast-paced turbulent change as a result of economic 
liberalization, rapid industrialization, and increased integration into the global economy. In these 
contexts, the society and economy are undergoing a process of coevolution, and the onus is often 
on organizations to pursue and promote not only economic but also social development 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Luo, 2006; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). In the last 
decade, emerging economies have assumed an increasingly prominent position in the global 
economy, such that they are projected to account for more than half of world GDP on the basis 
of purchasing power by the end of 2014 (see Figure 1). The rapid rise and development of 
emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and Indonesia in the 21
st 
century has attracted tremendous interest from managers and investors, yet our theories have not 
kept pace (Davis & Marquis, 2005). As Wright, Filtotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng (2005: 27) 
convincingly argue, research with a focus on emerging economies is both an opportunity and a 
necessity – as they are “fertile grounds not only for testing existing theories but also for 
developing new ones.”  Accordingly, we propose that research in emerging economies feature 
more prominently in organizational studies as we move forward. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
While the specific context that we examine in the paper is emerging economies, our 
intention is to review and synthesize various streams of research; and in so doing, identify and 
map the complex array of institutional strategies that firms undertake – which can then be 			
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generalized to business organizations in other contexts as well. To date, strategies that can be 
considered part of firms’ institutional strategizing have been variously referred to as non-market 
or political strategies (De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Baron, 1995), collective action (King & Pearce, 2010; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Walker 
& Rea, 2014), and stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997).  Although 
these literatures are not traditionally considered under the institutional theory ambit, a common 
feature is that they address how organizations strategically manage their broader external 
environments; and, as such, provide important insights for theorizing about institutional 
processes.  Conceptualizing these strategies as ‘institutional’ provides an opportunity to 
synthesize these rich, yet disparate streams of research – thus, offering a more accurate 
identification of the overarching conceptual domain.   
We define the term institutional strategy as the comprehensive set of plans and actions 
directed at leveraging and shaping the socio-political and cultural institutions within an 
organization’s external environment. Our review of the literature reveals that organizations 
engage in three specific and identifiable sets of institutional strategies, which we term: 
relational, infrastructure-building, and socio-cultural bridging. In unpacking the concept of 
institutional strategies in this way, we aim to develop an integrative framework that outlines a 
more interactive and reciprocal view of institutional processes – one that highlights the agentic 
and intent-driven nature of organizational responses to institutional pressures, and the importance 
of institutional perspectives in firms’ strategic action in the globalizing economy.  We argue that 
such a perspective is an important new frontier of institutional research in organizational studies. 
Thus, our review is centered on highlighting important areas for cross-disciplinary dialogue, and 			
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guiding future scholarship in exploring how organizations navigate the complexities of their 
institutional environments.   
INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES AS THE NEW FRONTIER OF INSTITUTIONAL 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES	
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars from various disciplines including economics, political 
science and sociology began focusing on how institutions – or the formal and informal “rules of 
the game” – affected organizational and economic activity (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). In 
organizational studies, the research that built on this tradition tended to emphasize the capacity 
of institutions to control and constrain organizational behavior through external environmental 
factors (c.f. Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008; Scott, 2014; Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012).  For example, significant empirical work in this area focused on how cultural 
expectations, legitimacy, and isomorphic processes exerted pressures on the organization to 
conform to “legitimate practice” in a given institutional field (e.g. Fligstein, 1985; Galaskiewicz 
& Wasserman, 1989; Davis, 1991). This early work in institutional theory was powerful in 
demonstrating the substantial isomorphic forces in organizational fields, which “impose 
restrictions by defining legal, moral, and cultural boundaries, distinguishing between acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior” (Scott, 2014: 58) – thus, addressing DiMaggio and Powell’s original 
question of “why do organizations look so similar?”   
Later streams of research within organizational studies shifted the focus from examining 
continuity and constraint in social structures to exploring how actors exercise agentic behavior 
and instigate change (c.f. Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Thornton et al., 2012). As Oliver (1991) 
pointed out, organizational responses to homogenizing institutional pressures can range from 
passive conformity to active resistance depending on the nature and context of the pressures. Yet 			
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beyond active resistance is the possibility that organizations may adopt a more proactive and 
agentive stance towards such pressures. North (2006:60), for example, notes that organizations 
may induce institutional change directly or indirectly by “altering the rules” through political 
bodies or social organizations; or, by “deliberately (and sometimes accidentally) altering the … 
effectiveness of sanction and other means of informal constraint enforcement.” Recent studies of 
institutional change within mature fields have also shown that organizations confronted with 
multiple, potentially conflicting, institutional pressures become aware of field-level 
‘contradictions’ – which enable them to think reflexively about the limitations of existing 
arrangements (Battliana et. al. 2006; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002). This reflexivity opens up 
the possibility for embedded actors to collectively mobilize in an effort to strategically shape the 
institutional context around them.  
Research in other disciplines, including strategy and international business, have also 
embraced an institutional perspective – one that is rooted both in the sociological work 
mentioned above as well as economic traditions stemming from the work of Douglass North 
(1990; e.g. see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998).  As Ingram and Silverman (2002: 
20) noted, “institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to 
formulate and implement strategy.”  With the changing competitive landscape confronting firms 
as globalization progresses, scholars have increasingly advocated taking an “institution-based” 
approach to investigate and understand how contextual factors affect competition, performance, 
and the development of sustainable competitive advantages (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng et 
al., 2008; Oliver, 1997).  While the above sets of research have examined the affects of 
institutional pressures and contexts on organizational action, there has been growing recognition 			
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that organizations think strategically about institutions – both about global contexts more 
generally, and about the need to adapt to the particularities of local contexts. The term 
institutional strategy was first considered by Lawrence (1999: 161), who identified two basic 
types: “(1) membership strategies that involve the definition of rules of membership and their 
meaning for an institutional community; and (2) standardization strategies that are concerned 
with the establishment of technical legal or market standards that define the "normal" processes 
involved in the production of some good or service.”  While we agree that these are important, 
they may only scratch the surface of what is possible and necessary in today’s global 
environment.  
Building on the widespread interest in institutional processes and their effects on 
organizations, we review a series of literatures that aim to explain how organizations are active 
in shaping their external environments. While these literatures derive from different legacies and 
antecedents, taking stock of this growing body of research is critical to our capacity to think 
comprehensively about the institutional conditions confronting organizations. We integrate these 
literatures under a common heading by adopting a broad definition of institutional strategies – 
one that includes all plans and actions taken by organizations to strategically manage socio-
political and cultural institutions, or leverage them to an organization’s competitive advantage. 
Our main point is that organizations need to be proactive about diagnosing and shaping their 
external environments. Contrasting with earlier perspectives that viewed institutions as top-down 
pressures that shaped organizations (Scott, 2011), our perspective foregrounds the strategic 
interaction between organizations and their institutional environments.  In doing so, our review 
aims to showcase institutional theory as the theory of action for the 21st century.   			
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In the following section, we outline the critical features that differentiate emerging markets 
from developed markets, and draw attention to the importance of these differences on an 
organization’s operations, strategic focus, and overall competitive landscape. 
WHY INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES ARE ESSENTIAL IN EMERGING MARKETS 
As key growth markets for firms, emerging markets have attracted increased scholarly 
attention (Li, 2001) – with emphasis being placed on examining the role of institutional factors in 
channeling organizational decisions and actions. This growing interest is clearly reflected in two 
recent special issues on strategic management in emerging markets. In Hoskisson et al.’s (2000) 
Academy of Management Journal special issue, the editors highlighted institutional theory as one 
of the key theories used in the special issue papers.  Then, five years later, in a special issue of 
the Journal of Management Studies, Wright et al. (2005) noted that institutional theory “has 
indeed risen, as predicted by Hoskisson et al. (2000), to become a new dominant theory guiding 
strategy research on emerging economies.”  
As scholarship on emerging markets has developed over recent decades, researchers have 
pointed to a number of important differences among emerging economies. Most notable is the 
difference between traditional developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the 
Middle East and transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and East Asia 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Wright et al., 2005).  This latter group of 
countries is uniquely characterized by a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy – reflected in increased privatization, the changing role of government, and legal and 
institutional reforms. Other important differences between emerging markets include the level of 
industrial development, the extent of market liberalization, the degree of integration into the 
global economy, and the rate of economic development and growth.  			
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Despite these differences, emerging economies share a number of characteristics that not 
only differentiate them from the more traditionally studied developed markets, but also create a 
set of general challenges for navigating their business environments. Thus, for the purposes of 
our review, we focus more on the similarities across emerging markets in terms of economic, 
market and institutional conditions. We also highlight key sources of variation between emerging 
and developed market contexts – which we argue is an important first step in better 
understanding how organizations can strategically manage or alter aspects of their institutional 
environment to their competitive advantage.  In the discussion we offer recommendations for 
future research that examines how the institutional strategies that we identify may vary across 
different emerging economies.  
Economic and Market Conditions.  A defining feature of emerging market economies is 
that they are “low-income, rapid-growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary 
engine of growth” (Hoskisson et. al, 2000: 249; see also Arnold & Quelch, 1998).  The 
importance of such markets to global corporations and investors is demonstrated by the 
proliferation of emerging market typologies, such as BRICS, CIVITS, EAGLES,
 1 and the 
development of lists of emerging economies by key market actors including the IMF, FTSE, 
MSCI, S&P, Dow Jones and Russell. Table 1 provides a list of countries considered emerging 
economies across current categorizations – importantly, it shows general convergence on which 
countries are included.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
																																																								
1	The	BRICS	are	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	China,	and	South	Africa;	CIVITS	are	Columbia,	Indonesia,	Vietnam,	Egypt,	Turkey,	and	
South	Africa;	EAGLES	are	Brazil,	China,	India,	Indonesia,	South	Korea,	Mexico,	Russia,	Taiwan,	and	Turkey.					
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Figure 2 plots the major countries of the world along the dimensions of economic growth 
rate and per capita GDP – key dimensions by which emerging economies are identified.  As the 
figure shows, countries that are typically considered emerging economies are clustered in the 
middle of the graph, occupying a prime spot with respect to future growth prospects: relatively 
high recent GDP growth rates and moderate GDP per capita. These economies are often 
characterized by rapidly improving living standards, active consumer markets, and a burgeoning 
middle class population. Advanced economies, in contrast, are clustered on the bottom right side 
of the graph, reflecting a relatively low average GDP growth rate and high GDP per capita. 
These economies have typically reached a relatively mature state of industrial development and 
are characterized by a service-oriented market and minimal government intervention in the 
business sphere. As for developing economies, the average GDP growth rate varies considerably 
and the average GDP per capita is low – leading to a clustering of these countries on the left side 
of the graph. These developing countries tend to have high levels of poverty and unemployment, 
accompanied by low standards of living and short life expectancies.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In terms of economic and market conditions, emerging economies differ markedly from 
advanced economies in a number of systematic ways. Rapid economic development, 
industrialization, and modernization make emerging markets particularly attractive destinations 
for export, foreign direct investment, and the sourcing of production and manufacturing.  Thus, 
there are critical differences in the business mix – with emerging economies having a higher 
proportion of manufacturing, labor-intensive industries, and large-scale heavy industrial sectors 
(Murrel & Wang, 1993; Sit & Liu, 2000). Such characteristics are in many ways the hallmark of 
their growth trajectories, as lower labor costs tend to drive growth in manufacturing and exports.  			
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This pattern, however, has been shown to shift over time as the emerging market grows and 
evolves. In particular, rising household incomes provide consumers with more opportunities for 
discretionary purchases, resulting in the emergence of a middle-class consumer sector – as was 
the case for Indonesia and the Philippines, which have now transitioned into strong domestic 
economies. 
Capital markets also tend to be less developed in emerging economies than in advanced 
ones – thus, making financial exchanges more volatile, trading less liquid, and inflation 
particularly problematic. Moreover, key financial intermediaries such as accounting firms, 
financial analysts, and venture capitalists are typically either absent or only marginal present (Li 
& Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Peng & Heath, 1996) – creating information asymmetries within the 
markets that can be exploited by firms. Not only does this increase the potential for opportunism 
because of the prohibitively high costs monitoring (Marquis & Qian, 2014), but it also makes 
legal contracts difficult to enforce. Overall, the conditions imply a relatively higher degree of 
volatility in the market and rapidly changing risk profiles, as compared to their more developed 
counterparts.   
Institutional Conditions. In addition to baseline economic differences, numerous political, 
legal, socio-cultural, and technological factors differentiate the business environment of 
emerging economies from that of developed economies. One critical factor is the strong 
influence of the government and the prevalence of state-owned firms (Douma, George, & Kabir, 
2006; Evans, 1995; Musacchio, & Lazzarini, 2014; Ralston Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & 
Egri, 2006). As Kowalski et al. (2013) point out, the shares of SOEs among the Forbes Global 
2000 companies currently exceed 50% for China, India and Indonesia; and are at 39 and 19% for 
Russia and Brazil, respectively. Given these figures, it is important for businesses to consider the 			
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frequency and level of government interventions, as well as the overall stability of the political 
environment in their operational decisions. As studies have shown, emerging market 
governments may be more susceptible to external conflicts, coups, and internal tensions – which 
can create a difficult operating environment for companies (Hiatt & Sine, 2014).   Figure 3 
documents the different types of political regimes that exist across emerging economies.   
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Other important differentiating factors include greater informality and less developed 
government and regulatory infrastructures in emerging economies.  At a basic level, both 
regulatory and enforcement environments are only marginally developed, such that market 
regulation, corporate governance, transparency, accounting standards, and intellectual property 
protection may not be as reliable or mature as those in more advanced economies (Marquis, 
Zhang & Zhou, 2011; Marquis & Qian, 2014). Under these conditions, corruption and 
opportunistic behavior may be especially problematic.  Thus, international firms doing business 
in emerging markets frequently turn to detailed contracts to govern their joint ventures (Luo, 
2002). 
Beyond differences in political and legal institutions, there are critical differences in the 
socio-cultural environment of emerging economies.  Emerging economies, in particular, tend to 
be characterized by a younger population, an expanding workforce, and rapid urbanization. 
These factors have important implications for day-to-day business operations, including 
marketing and promotion strategies, staffing and training, and consumer preferences. In addition, 
many socio-cultural issues in emerging economies are ideologically fuelled – suggesting that 
some of the parties involved may have an interest in sustaining rather than resolving conflicts 
(Lamertz et al. 2003; Mahon, Heugens, & Lamertz, 2004). It is therefore crucial for businesses to 			
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be aware of, and attentive to, issues such as income inequality and poverty, gender inequality, 
and ethnic and linguistic factionalization – issues that can easily trigger social turmoil and 
upheaval (Ault & Spicer, 2014).  
Lastly, emerging economies typically have less developed or inadequate technological and 
physical infrastructures as compared to developed economies. For example, inadequate 
communication technology, commercial and transportation infrastructures, power generation 
capabilities, and distribution channels are critical challenges that businesses need to consider and 
overcome (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Miller, 1998).  
As the discussion above clearly shows, there are important differences in the economic and 
institutional conditions of emerging and developed market economies. Of course there are also 
differences among emerging economies themselves – for example, those noted between 
traditional developing economies and transitional economies. As Wright et al. (2005: 27) note, it 
is “not clear whether experience from centrally planned economies in transition applies to those 
emerging economies that have not followed this trajectory.” Yet, despite such differences, there 
are important similarities that provide common ground for the types of institutional strategies, 
which may be effective or appropriate in these contexts. 
Our approach in this review goes beyond identifying target markets of opportunity for 
global investors; and, instead, focuses on identifying the key institutional challenges that are 
generalizable across emerging economy contexts. In doing so, we aim to classify the types of 
strategies that have been advanced for addressing these challenges and the implications that these 
strategies have on an organization’s operations and strategic focus. We foreground the 
importance of institutional strategies in emerging markets because these are contexts where the 
economy and society are coevolving at a rapid rate (Luo, 2006).  As Hoskisson et al., (2000:252) 			
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point out, “government and societal influences are stronger in these emerging economies than in 
developed economies.”  Not only is it well known that in these contexts the government is a key 
constraint – often applying a heavy hand in shaping economic growth trajectories and associated 
business activity; but the lack of well-established legal and market infrastructures has pushed 
organizations to adopt a strategic perspective that encompasses both market imperatives and 
social and cultural concerns. 
Table 2 describes in more detail the key dimensions by which emerging contexts vary from 
developed contexts. These critical variations have important theoretical and practical 
implications. On a theoretical level, the large-scale institutional changes that often characterize 
emerging market contexts embody complex economic and social processes that are still little 
understood (Roland, 2000) – which has prompted calls for more research adopting institutional 
perspectives (Child & Lu, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005). On a 
practical level, a better understanding of these critical variations will help organizations navigate 
the complex challenges of emerging market contexts, such as increased transaction costs, market 
vulnerabilities to large macroeconomic and political instabilities, underdeveloped or missing 
infrastructures (Mair & Marti, 2009; Mair, Marti and Ventresca 2012), and rampant 
opportunistic behavior, bribery, and corruption (Cuadra & Sapriza, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Wright et al., 2005). These unique sets of challenges underscore the importance of recognizing 
and attending to key institutional factors that shape the business landscape of emerging 
economies.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 			
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To compete effectively in the 21
st century, firms in both emerging and developed 
economies have to be more sensitive to local environments and to their idiosyncratic institutional 
demands. Since the 1990s, organizations have increasingly been exposed to a diverse set of 
political, social and cultural environments.  Yet theory, until recently, has mainly focused on 
how such environments become increasingly similar owing to the homogenizing pressures of 
globalization (Meyer et al., 1997).  Our perspective is that local and regional differences will 
persist, creating variegated challenges for organizations as they expand into new markets and 
engage in cross-border partnerships (Marquis & Battilana, 2009). 
After reviewing literature spanning various disciplines including strategy, international 
business, political science, entrepreneurship and organization studies, we found that institutional 
strategies can be broadly categorized along three dimensions: relational, infrastructure-building, 
and socio-cultural bridging. While our identification of these different strategies emerged from 
our review of the literature, we note that they also generally correspond to prior typologies of 
institutional variation (e.g. Scott, 2014; Busenitz, Gómez, & Spencer, 2000). A key difference 
between our conceptualization and this prior work, however, is that our typology is grounded in 
action-oriented strategies as opposed to descriptive classifications of the underlying dimensions 
of institutions and institutional environments.  
Relational strategies refer to the integrated set of organizational activities directed at 
managing relationships with important referent audiences. These strategies include networking 
efforts to manage dependency relationships with the government (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Siegel, 
2007) and key stakeholder groups such as employees, suppliers, and customers (Freeman, 1984; 
Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010).  Infrastructure building strategies are those designed to 
address marginally developed markets, and underdeveloped social, technological, and physical 			
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infrastructures.  For example, where institutions are missing or inadequate, firms frequently 
utilize strategies such as collective action (King & Pearce, 2010; Walker and Rea, 2014) and 
defining global or industry standards (Bartley, 2007) to address such challenges. Socio-cultural 
bridging refers to strategies that tackle the socio-cultural and demographic issues that can be 
challenging for organizations – which, for emerging economies, include managing and training 
younger populations and attending to ideologically-fueled tension and social unrest.  In the 
following section, we develop the conceptualization of the three types of strategies further – 
detailing how they have been discussed in the literature and the relative appropriateness of 
particular strategies in emerging economy contexts. 
Relational Strategies 
A critical dimension of an organization’s institutional strategizing relates to how it interacts 
with and manages important referent audiences. Through effective management of relationships 
with both internal and external actors, organizations can not only enhance their competitive 
position in the market (Berman et al., 1999; Heugens et al., 2002; Hillman et al., 1999; Ibarra, 
1992; Poldony, 1993), but also ensure the stability and certainty of its resource exchanges 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Two interrelated streams of research 
have provided strong empirical support for these claims – namely, stakeholder management and 
corporate political strategy. Studies in these traditions have underscored the importance of the 
target, prioritization, and timing of an organization’s relational strategies.  
Research on stakeholder management suggests that an organization should take a broad 
view of its dependence relationships – to include  “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). Ample 
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that effective management of ‘primary’ stakeholder 			
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groups has a positive impact on financial performance (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; 
Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Waddock & Graves, 1997), organizational learning and 
innovation (Heugens et al., 2002; Harting Harmeling & Vankataraman, 2006), and the 
development of intangible assets (Hillman & Keim, 2001).  Conversely, failure to attend to key 
stakeholder concerns has been shown to irreparably damage an organization’s legitimacy, and 
threaten its profitability and growth potential (Berman et al., 1999; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004).  
Studies on stakeholder theory have also revealed that corporations strategically manage 
diverse stakeholder groups – prioritizing them depending on their power, legitimacy, and the 
extent to which they can muster a sense of urgency in their demands (Mitchell et al., 1997). From 
an instrumental perspective, being embedded in a network of stakeholders “acting as a complex 
system for exchanging goods, services, information, technology, talent, influence, money, and 
other resources” (Harrison et al., 2010: 60) provides organizations with an opportunity to shape 
stakeholder relations to their competitive advantage. As Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey’s (2013) 
study of the global mining industry demonstrated, companies carefully manage external relations 
as a means to “reduce opportunistic hold-up by stakeholders” with whom the firm has no direct 
ties, but whose cooperation is needed for the firm to “create and capture value.”  
Research on corporate political strategy explores a specific dependence relationship – that 
between business and the government. Studies in this tradition  show that the increasing 
complexity and pervasive influence of government policies in the market economy have made 
navigating the public policy arena a top priority for many organizations. This trend has led to 
growing scholarly interest in the area of corporate political activity (CPA), defined as a set of 
activities aimed at shaping or producing public policy outcomes that are favorable to a firm’s 			
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continued economic survival and success (De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001; Keim & Baysinger, 
1988; Schuler, 1996). Indeed, there has been a proliferation of research documenting the 
antecedents of corporate political activity at various levels of analysis (for a review, see Hillman, 
Keim & Schuler, 2004; and Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011), the types of political strategies and 
tactics organizations deploy (e.g. Gao, 2006; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Jia, 2014; Weidenbaum, 
1980; Zhao, 2012; Walker & Rea, 2014), and the resultant outcomes of CPA on public policy 
(Choi, Jia & Lu, 2014; Campbell, 1998; Dean, Vryza, & Fryxell, 1998; Holburn & Vanden 
Bergh, 2008; Keim & Zardkoohi, 1988; Lord, 2000; Ramirez & Eigen-Zucchi, 2001) and firm 
performance (Cook & Fox, 2000; Hiatt & Park, 2013; Lux et al., 2011; Shaffer, Quasney, & 
Grimm, 2000). 
Insights from this body of research suggest that firms direct their CPA to react to, 
anticipate, defend against, or proactively shape public policy arenas and political demands 
(Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; see also, Bonardi, Holburn, &Vanden Bergh, 2006; Hillman et al., 
2004; Weidenbaum 1980). Other studies have found that by strategically managing business-
government relations, firms can enhance political legitimacy, receive preferential policy status, 
and gain access to critical state resources (Hillman et al., 2004; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Zhao, 
2012). Thus, as the magnitude and scope of government policies continue to expand into nearly 
every aspect of business (Keim & Hillman, 2008), effective strategic political management 
becomes a critical factor in a firm’s current and future competitive position (Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Yoffie, 1988) – because, as Weidenbaum (1980: 46) aptly 
notes, public policy is no longer a “spectator sport for business.” Barley (2007: 201) goes further, 
warning that organizations “now wield inordinate political power,” enabling them to “undermine 			
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representative democracy and the public good: promoting legislation that benefits corporations at 
the expense of individual citizens.” 
Relational strategies in emerging economies. Much of the literature to date in these areas 
has explicitly focused on developed market economy contexts – with little attention paid to the 
relative applicability of these strategies in contexts characterized by weak or underdeveloped 
market structures, poorly specified property rights, frequent government interventions, and 
vulnerabilities to political and social instability. Relational strategies that are effective in 
developed economy contexts may be ill-suited for, or misaligned with, the idiosyncratic 
conditions of an emerging market economy context.  Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008: 930), for 
example, argue that while research in developed economies indicate that some firms actively 
seek to shape the ‘rules of the game’ in their favor, such political strategies may be less effective 
in emerging economies, given their “generally nontransparent political and regulatory 
environment.” That is, rather than proactively seeking to influence public policy, organizations 
may focus their political strategies on furthering their own self-interests – e.g. getting 
government subsidies, licenses, and tax exemptions (Hillman et al., 2004; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). 
Because the government typically has a high degree of control over key factors of production, 
market access and valuable natural resources, effective management of these resource 
dependences may be more critical to an organization’s performance and long-term viability than 
in developed market economy contexts (Peng & Heath, 1996; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
A nascent, but growing, body of research has highlighted the importance of interpersonal 
networks, social capital, and informal institutions in contexts of ‘institutional uncertainty’, 
wherein social norms, trust, and personal ties are critical in facilitating cooperation and 
regulation of social behavior (Peng et al., 2008; Chung, 2006; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Luo & 			
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Chung, 2005; Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009; Zhu & 
Chung, forthcoming). Peng and Luo (2000), for example, found that managers relied heavily on 
interpersonal networks as informal substitutes for weak market structures – using alliances and 
inter-organizational agreements to both grow the firm and assure that the terms of a transaction 
would be met by the parties involved. Similarly, Nee (1992: 10) documented that in socialist 
states many private firms depended upon informal sources of credit and close ties with local 
governments in order to compensate for “restrictions on factor resources and the continuing 
pariah-like status of capitalists and merchants.” Such political savvy has been found to be 
particularly consequential in emerging economies, where rule of law is absent, regulations can 
change quickly and the risk of expropriation and government intervention is relatively high. 
These studies suggest that the integration of corporate political strategies with market 
strategies is of critical importance in emerging economies because boundaries between 
government and business spheres are often blurred (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Keim & Hillman, 2008; 
Wang, 2014). As Melewar, Badal, and Small’s (2006) study of Danone’s entry into China 
showed, political sensitivity toward power relations and the need to win (and keep) the goodwill 
of influential people in business and politics was crucial in gaining market acceptance. Puffer, 
McCarthy, and Boisot (2010) similarly demonstrated that entrepreneurs relied heavily upon 
‘blat’ and ‘guanxi’ – i.e. informal connections and relationships based on reciprocity and 
exchange of favors within Russia and China, respectively – to help reduce uncertainty, protect 
private property and ownership rights, and facilitate business transactions. These types of 
informal networks and cultural institutions are especially critical in contexts where formal legal 
and regulatory institutions that support business activities are underdeveloped or missing.  			
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While up to this point, we have emphasized the benefits and advantages of close ties with 
the government and other political actors, there is a growing body of research suggesting that 
such ties are associated with a number of vulnerabilities and constraints.  For example, studies 
have shown that direct ties to the government may expose an organization to strong pressures to 
divert its resources to advance political goals and agendas (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Marquis & 
Qian, 2014). Nee and Opper (2010) point out that state-owned firms with connections to political 
elite have been found to perform worse than private firms because they may be forced to 
maintain higher employment levels (see also, Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; and Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994). Similarly, Child and Lu (1996) showed that the economic reform of large state-
owned enterprises in China was hindered by constraints associated with close ties to the 
government. Such findings echo those of Kozhikode an Li (2012), who revealed that commercial 
banks in India that were either owned or dependent on the government were not able to take 
advantage of political opportunities to the same extent as their private counterparts. Thus, while 
politically-connected firms may enjoy a number of advantages over their peers, these advantages 
may come at a cost – particularly if the value of such connections depreciate or become negative 
after unexpected political shocks (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010: 1162).  
On a broader stakeholder level, studies of advanced market economies have highlighted 
various strategies that firms use to gain stakeholder support, manage stakeholders, and balance 
stakeholder interests (for a review, see Laplume et al, 2008). Yet, questions remain of “both the 
desirability and feasibility of introducing or even imposing American-type approaches in 
emerging economies” (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 263). For instance, while the strategy of balancing 
the claims of primary stakeholder groups has been argued to optimize firm welfare in developed 
market economies (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Harrison & St. John, 1996; Walsh, 2005), such a 			
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strategy may not be effective or feasible in emerging economies. This is likely the case in labor-
intensive industries, where profit margins are so narrow that simultaneously attending to the 
demands of multiple audiences may threaten an organization’s financial performance and 
survival as a going concern (Campbell, 2007). Such situations may lead organizations to 
prioritize the concerns and interests of shareholders above those of customers and the wider 
public. Julian and Ofori-dankwa (2013), for example, note that while studies undertaken in 
developed economies posit a positive relationship between firm financial resource availability 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditures, they found that the reverse may be true 
in emerging economies – where the government is focused more on economic development and 
job creation than CSR; and, where NGOs lack established and/or effective advocacy strategies. 
In emerging economies, in other words, the prioritization of stakeholder groups may not be 
an issue of stakeholders’ power or legitimacy (c.f. Mitchell et al., 1997), but rather the “sticks 
and carrots” inherent in the competitive market environment. Authoritarian regimes such as 
China and Turkey exercise strict media and Internet censorship and, further, suppress the 
development of NGOs and consumer watchdog organizations. This leaves few outlets for 
stakeholders to express their frustrations and concerns – save for boycotts and other forms of 
private politics (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). Consequently, stakeholder 
management in these contexts is likely to require alternative negotiation and communication 
channels than those typically used (and taken-for-granted) in democratic countries. For instance 
in the absence of a well-developed NGO sector, Internet activism has become an important 
mechanism for civil society expression (Luo, Zhang & Marquis, 2014). 
For multinationals operating in emerging economies, another important consideration 
relates to home country stakeholder concerns. Soule et al. (2014), for example, found that 			
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pressure from home country stakeholders played a greater role in multinationals’ divestment 
decisions in Burma than did financial considerations or unrealized business opportunities. In 
particular, the nation’s human rights abuses and brutal repression of the pro-democracy 
movement began to have damaging effects on both the image and credibility of multinationals 
operating in Burma.  
Given the important differences in the institutional conditions of emerging and developed 
market economy contexts, it is critical to consider the relative appropriateness of transposing 
particular relational strategies and practices across these contexts. Failure to consider the 
transferability of relational strategies may jeopardize an organization’s competitive advantage 
and destabilize its resource exchanges with government bodies and key stakeholder groups 
(Berman et al., 1999; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 1999). 
Infrastructure Building Strategies 
  Core to economic and sociological approaches to markets is the importance of an 
institutional infrastructure to facilitate market interactions and transactions. Presence of both 
formal and informal “rules of the game” allows for participants without prior interaction to 
conduct business and transactions in a more predictable and efficient manner. When such 
infrastructure is absent or limited, there are a number of challenges that need to be overcome. 
Research on developed markets has posited various mechanisms to address these challenges, 
including collectively organizing (King & Pearce, 2010). Studies in this tradition typically draw 
on social movement theory, particularly the mechanisms of mobilization structures, political 
opportunity, and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). There are many 
examples of institutional entrepreneurs creating new organizational forms or arrangements to 
overcome institutional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Rao (1998), 			
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for example, traced how the absence of well-defined consumer protections in the early 20
th 
century United States led social entrepreneurs to establish consumer watchdog organizations to 
advocate for consumer interests. Other studies have also pointed to the rise self-regulation 
schemes promoted by industry groups such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program 
(Gunningham, 1995; King & Lenox, 2000); as well as to the myriad of cases where businesses 
have organized to develop or refine the formal regulatory environment (Davis & Thompson, 
1994; Walker & Rea, 2014). Such organizing is similar to Lawrence’s (1999) idea of 
membership strategies that involve the definition of rules of membership and their meaning for 
an institutional community. In all of these cases, groups of actors work to establish a set of rules 
or guidelines to better define or guide future business interactions.   
In addition to highlighting the development of new organizational arrangements and the 
promotion of regulatory changes, the non-market strategy literature has implicated the 
importance of standardization strategies that are “concerned with the establishment of technical, 
legal or informal standards that define what is "normal" for a practice, product, or service.” 
(Lawrence, 1999: 177). One well known set of global standards, for example, is that of the 
International Standards Organization (ISO), an organization whose goal is to facilitate global 
commerce through defining consistent standards for business to follow across a wide array of 
product categories and business processes (Guler, Guillen, & MacPherson, 2002). Another 
important international project is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which promotes a 
standard set of environmental, social and governance metrics for corporations – as a means to 
encourage companies to report on these items, and to raise awareness of these issues on global 
level (Etzion, & Ferraro, 2010; Marquis & Qian, 2014).   
Infrastructure building strategies in emerging economies.  A significant research thrust of 			
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the work on emerging economies focuses on how many elements of the institutional 
infrastructure to facilitate business that are taken for granted in developed economies are not 
present or only marginally developed (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Mair, Marti & Ventresca, 2012.  
As Arnold and Quelch (1998: 9) describe, in emerging economies, “there is little or no reliable 
market data, nonexistent or poorly developed distribution systems, relatively few communication 
channels, and both a lack of regulatory discipline and a propensity to change business regulations 
frequently and unpredictably.” Such conditions are problematic because they create additional 
uncertainty and challenges for firms (Ault & Spicer, 2014). For one, organizations must contend 
with underdeveloped physical and commercial infrastructures such as inadequate communication 
and transportation channels. Luthra, Mangaleswaran and Padhi (2005), for example, note that 
companies doing business in the Indian market need to overcome the challenges of poor roads 
and locked seaports, which can make it difficult to transport goods and work with suppliers. In 
addition, there is often a lack of well-established property rights and intellectual property 
protection regulations, which pose a significant threat to the competitive advantage of firms – as 
piracy and patent infringements can “siphon away revenue and damage brand image” (Bird, 
2006: 431). And as Uzo and Mair (2014) showed in a study of the Nigerian movie industry, in 
these contexts, it may not be lack of formal institutions per se, but that emerging market contexts 
are characterized by an ambiguity in formal institutions, coupled with an availability of informal 
arrangements.   
To address some of these issues, firms frequently develop and rely more heavily on 
informal mechanisms in their day-to-day operations (Hoskisson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 
1998; Peng & Heath, 1996).  For example, Khanna et al. (2005) described how in countries like 
China where food safety problems are endemic, supermarket chain Metro has fostered networks 			
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between farmers and distributors in rural areas in order to improve the quality and reliability of 
its meats and vegetables. More generally, a long standing set of research on institutional voids, 
has shown the importance of developing business groups to minimize opportunistic behavior and 
transaction costs (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Nachum, 2004).  
Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) argue that venture capitalists in settings with weak regulatory 
institutions would be more likely to fund geographically proximate firms as monitoring would be 
easier and more important in such settings.   
A number of studies have also underscored the importance of developing intermediary 
institutions and processes as a way to address uncertainty.  These could include institutions such 
as credit agencies and standard setting bodies (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), as well as programs to 
develop intermediary skills, human capital and relevant expertise.  Marquis, Yin and Yang (2013) 
for instance analyzed how the Chinese government and large companies participated in the 
creation of a new set of China specific CSR reporting standards and training programs to help 
Chinese companies implement this new global practice. 	More	generally,	London and Hart 
(2004) found that successful MNCs often incorporate local capacity building such as training 
programs and advisory services directly into their business models.  Other studies have identified 
the importance of business processes to better manage increased uncertainty. Hiatt and Sine’s 
(2014) study of entrepreneurship in Columbia, for example, showed that the uncertainty caused 
by violence and unrest could be offset by formal business planning. In general, the lack of 
intermediaries and intermediary business processes in emerging economies creates a significant 
constraint on firm activities – often requiring creative action to overcome.  
Another type of infrastructure building strategy is the development or promotion of new or 
global standards in order to foster a common language and understanding of business practices 			
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and outcomes (Guler et al., 2002). The importance of global standards has attracted international 
attention as global consumers increasingly focus on labor and environmental conditions in 
supply chains. For example, Tim Bartley (2003; 2007) has a series of studies that examined the 
evolution of the Forest Stewardship Council, an example of “market-oriented, nongovernmental 
standards and monitoring systems as a supplement to state regulation” (O’Rourke 2003: 5). 
Tarnovskaya (2012) showed how Ikea worked directly with World Wildlife Fund, a global 
nonprofit, to develop responsible forestry management and certification of IKEA’s wood 
suppliers in Russia and China – two contexts where such standards did not exist. The result was a 
set of practices and tools for not only educating and training suppliers, but also raising awareness 
throughout the rest of society.  Regarding global standards, the GRI standard has dramatically 
increased the uptake of environmental reporting, yet there are also questions about whether or 
not the existence of global practice and standards just makes it easier for organizations in 
emerging markets to only symbolically comply with global norms (Marquis & Qian, 2014; see 
also Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012; and Tilcsik, 2010)).   
While one set of strategies helps firms deal with the uncertainty of emerging markets, 
another set helps them build greater legitimacy within society, as well as in the eyes of key 
stakeholder groups such as consumers, governments and civil society. When firms compete in 
non-home country markets, they frequently face an ‘illegitimacy discount’ (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002), which shapes how they approach the given market (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  A 
common strategy to raise legitimacy is to promote economic and social development (Zhang & 
Luo, 2013; Marquis, Zhang, & Zhou, 2011), which not only helps with the specific brand and 
image of a particular firm, but also of multinationals more generally. It is important to recognize 
that consumer preferences in emerging markets may be different from those of consumers in 			
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home country markets such that corporations must first establish the legitimacy of an entire 
product category before they can effectively market their specific products. For instance, as 
Tarnovskaya (2012) showed, to succeed in markets like China, where the concept of modular 
furniture and consumers assembling furniture was not as institutionalized, Ikea conducted a 
number of media and marketing campaigns to educate consumers about this type of product.  
Where key commercial, technological, and physical infrastructures are missing or 
underdeveloped, savvy global businesses may step in and build these infrastructures in ways that 
create competitive advantage. Alternatively, they may bring with them the ‘missing’ 
infrastructure – transposing it from home to host countries (Miller, 1998). For businesses, then, it 
is critical to consider infrastructural gaps and necessities. Yet, at the same time, it is important to 
keep in mind that emerging economies are undergoing continual and rapid change – such that it 
may be “misguided short-termism to base corporate strategy on structural conditions that may be 
subject to rapid change, even though these may be suitable criteria for evaluating investments in 
emerging-economy stock markets” (Arnold & Quelch, 1998: 12). 
Socio-cultural Bridging Strategies 
It is widely acknowledged that business transactions and operations “do not happen in a 
vacuum, but in specific social, cultural, and political contexts” (Okhmatovskiy, 2010: 1039). 
Appreciating the particularities of the socio-cultural environment, and being able to address them 
accordingly, is a critical part of an organization’s daily operations and long-run success (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999; Peng et al., 2008). By adopting socio-cultural bridging strategies, organizations 
aim to address the socio-cultural and demographic issues (and challenges) that shape their 
competitive environment. 			
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In an increasingly integrated global economy, businesses are expected to understand and 
compete in institutionally diverse settings (Child & Lu, 1996; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Palmer, 
Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Peng & Heath, 1996). Research in international business and strategy, 
for example, underscores the importance of appreciating and attending to local norms, customs, 
and historical traditions when embarking on international diversification and cross-boarder 
partnerships (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006). Not 
surprisingly, studies have shown that it is easier for firms to do business in countries where the 
“social climate is similar to their own” – yet, much of the literature in strategy has “paid less 
attention to normative and cognitive institutions in favor of studying the regulatory environment” 
(Hitt et al., 2006: 847). The importance of understanding local contexts has also been 
emphasized in research on cultural entrepreneurship, which has highlighted how entrepreneurs 
leverage social and cultural resources to legitimate new organizational structures and practices 
(Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Johnson, 2007; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).  
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the differences across institutional 
settings, some scholars have advocated a comparison across three types of institutional domains: 
the regulatory, the cognitive, and the normative (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; see also, Busenitz et 
al., 2000; and Scott, 2008). Kostova and colleagues’ work on multinational enterprises argues 
that the greater the ‘institutional distance’ between the home and host countries, the more 
difficult it will be to understand and correctly interpret local institutional requirements. The 
implication is that organizations will have to increase the extent of adaptation required to better 
align their practices, strategies, and operations with the host country context (Kostova & Roth, 
2002; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This argument echoes that of Arnold and Quelch (1998: 12), 
who point out that, managers frequently base decisions to expand operations “not on objective 			
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market screening but on their own comfort level, choosing a predictable sequence of markets 
beginning with those closest in ‘psychic distance’ to their home culture.”  
For organizations operating in both advanced and emerging market economies, the critical 
challenge, then, is to navigate a large institutional divide – as the socio-cultural environment in 
these contexts are very different  (Busenitz et al., 2000; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002). While research on the varieties of capitalism has endeavored to 
understand institutional variation across developed nations (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 
1999), few studies have systematically examined institutional variation between developed and 
emerging market economy contexts. In consequence, we know relatively little about the 
applicability of cultural bridging strategies across these contexts.  
Socio-cultural bridging strategies in emerging economies.  In emerging economies, 
organizations need to address a set of complex demographic and socio-cultural issues. As noted 
earlier, organizations must attend to demographic challenges such as a young workforce, lack of 
available skilled workers, and increasing urbanization. These challenges may require companies 
to invest heavily in employee training and development, to bring over experts and managers 
from the organizations’ home countries, and/or to make location decisions based on the 
availability of skilled labor. Further, as more companies peg their prospects for growth on 
emerging markets, the “war for talent” intensifies – leaving companies with the challenging task 
of recruiting and retaining a local workforce that now has more options and higher expectations. 
(Ready, Hill, & Conger, 2008). Indeed, there is growing empirical evidence that establishing a 
core group of local talent is critical to understanding regional conditions and cultural norms. To 
do so, some companies export talent from their home countries to train local executives and 
managers – however, this strategy often requires extensive tailoring to succeed (Kostova & Roth, 			
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2002; Ready et al., 2008). As Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005) note, transporting managerial 
practices from one social context to another requires adaptation and, at times, the combination 
with local practices.   
In terms of socio-cultural issues, emerging economies often face a number of challenges 
including demographic disparities, ideologically-fuelled social unrest, and local hostility toward 
growing migrant worker populations (James, 2011; Lamertz et al. 2003). To address these socio-
cultural issues, companies must first develop an adequate knowledge of local socio-cultural 
conditions and features – which is critical to making informed judgments in day-to-day 
operations and for long-term strategic planning (Arnold & Quelch, 1998; Puffer et al., 2010). 
London and Hart (2004: 364), for example, advocate the importance of social embeddedness, 
which refers to “the ability to create competitive advantage based on a deep understanding of and 
integration with the local environment” – namely, by leveraging and building on the existing 
social infrastructure (see also, Chung & Luo, forthcoming). Similarly, Luo and Peng (1999: 272) 
note that local knowledge and experience can provide MNEs with a significant competitive 
advantage – reflecting an “ownership-specific, intangible asset which can generate economic 
rents.” Gaining such knowledge may require losing some control or delegating authority to local 
partners. Alternatively, it may require hiring local senior managers and consultants, investing in 
field investigations, and/or learning from local competitors. In any case, such strategies are often 
critical to success because socio-cultural misunderstandings or missteps can be very costly – not 
to mention, result in missed opportunities. As Melewar et al. (2006: 408) point out, companies 
seeking to expand their operations abroad need to “alter their modes of operation to suit 
prevailing cultural and market conditions.” 			
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Another important consideration in terms of cultural bridging – particularly in transition 
economies – is the enduring legacies of past Soviet-style market economies and Communist 
regimes (Child & Markoczy, 1993; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Murrell & Wang, 1993; Pop-
Eleches, 2007; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). Traces of these legacies can still be seen in 
the excess physical and human resources characterizing many state-owned, or recently 
privatized, firms. Peng and Heath (1996) attribute this pattern to the residual Socialist ideology 
of full employment – which has pressured managers to find uses for excess human resources 
rather than downsizing. Relatedly, there are still strong societal expectations from the labor force 
and wider public that organizations provide healthcare, education, and accommodation for 
employees and their families (Han, Zheng, & Xu, 2014; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Zu & Song, 
2009). Addressing these residual expectations is often challenging for organizations because they 
typically run counter to the logic of capitalism, which stresses the primacy of markets and 
competition (Tilcsik, 2010). Shaking off Socialist legacies, thus, requires more than changes in 
market and regulatory infrastructures, but rather fundamental shifts in underlying belief and 
value systems regarding business-employee relationships, private ownership, profit, and other 
aspects of a free-market economy.  
A greater appreciation of these legacies is critical for understanding how local norms, 
values, and expectations continue to enable and constrain organizational behavior and strategic 
action in emerging economies (Han et al., 2014; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). Raynard, 
Lounsbury, and Greenwood (2013), for example, found that the legacies of China’s past political 
regimes continued to shape how organizations conceptualized, experienced and implemented 
government-led CSR initiatives. Similarly, Stark (1996: 995) documented how the persistence of 			
	 34
routines, practices, and networks of affiliation could become “assets, resources, and the basis for 
credible commitments and coordinated actions in the postsocialist period.” 
As growing empirical evidence has revealed, firms need to invest significant time and 
resources to develop sufficient knowledge of local socio-cultural conditions – as countries have 
idiosyncratic institutional environments that can present a number of challenges for 
organizations that operate across multiple contexts (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu 
& Shenkar, 2002). It is thus critical for organizations to both appreciate and attend to local 
demographic and socio-cultural issues – because, as Peng et al. (2008: 922) point out, the 
“treatment of institutions as background is insufficient to gain a deep understanding of strategic 
behavior and firm performance … its deficiency becomes even more striking when probing into 
emerging economies.” Oftentimes, the formal and informal rules of the game differ between 
emerging and advanced economy contexts – such that without an adequate understanding of 
local institutional conditions, businesses may not only be at a disadvantage but also run into 
costly legal issues. For example, in China, “executives from competing firms can legally sit 
down, discuss pricing, and carve up markets – a practice that has been labeled by US antitrust 
laws as ‘collusion’ (Peng et al., 2008: 931).  
Taking stock of the rich literature on the similarities and differences across institutional 
contexts will provide a more holistic understanding of the unique pattern of social and cultural 
factors that shape business-society interactions. For organizations, a better understanding of 
socio-cultural differences is critical in helping bridge cultural divides that may hinder 
international expansion and growth – because, as organizational theorists have long contended, 
responding ‘appropriately’ to socio-cultural expectations is critical for gaining access to 
resources, legitimacy, and social approval (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  			
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In summary, Table 3 provides the key definition and examples of the three institutional 
strategies our review uncovered. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our focus on institutional strategies in emerging economies has a number of important 
theoretical and practical implications. While much prior work in organizational theory has 
focused on how external environments shape organizational structures and behavior (Scott & 
Davis, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2011), our argument centers on the idea that firms are not merely 
passive recipients of institutional pressures; but, instead, they interact with and reciprocally 
shape their institutional contexts.  In this review, we focused on identifying the critical factors 
that enable and constrain institutional strategizing in emerging economy contexts – yet our 
broader goal was to provide an integrated perspective on institutional strategies that applies to 
diverse contexts. Synthesizing a wide range of literature from strategy, international business, 
political science, entrepreneurship and organization studies, our review advances research on 
emerging markets and institutional theory by highlighting the agentic and intent-driven nature of 
organizational responses to institutional pressures – and the critical importance of such responses 
in emerging economy contexts.    
Bringing Emerging Markets Research to the Center of Organizational Studies 
Despite growing scholarly interest in examining emerging markets, there are few 
conceptual models that provide a comprehensive picture of the unique challenges and 
opportunities facing organizations in these contexts. As Mahon, Heugens, and Lamertz (2004: 
170) lament, current research has “has little to offer in the way of a truly integrated perspective 			
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on the management of non-market forces.”  By addressing these gaps, we are, in a sense, 
recommending a sea change in organizational theories – namely, the shifting from an emphasis 
on traditional developed markets and contexts to integrating emerging economies in how 
organizational behavior is conceptualized. As Figure 1 clearly shows, emerging market 
economies are quickly rising to the center of global markets. This important trend underscores 
the need for organizational studies to develop a perspective and approach to address 
organizational behavior within and across these markets.   
As a first step in this process, we reviewed work that can be considered part of a firm’s 
institutional strategizing, and identified three distinct sets of strategies that can be used to 
manage relationships with important referent audiences, address missing or underdeveloped 
infrastructures, and tackle demographic and socio-cultural challenges. From our review, it is 
clear that there has been a proliferation of research on the various relational strategies that 
organizations adopt to manage their relationships with political bodies and key stakeholder 
groups in emerging markets – with less attention being paid to examining infrastructure building 
and socio-cultural bridging strategies in these contexts. As such, we encourage further research 
in these particular areas in order to provide a more integrated perspective on the management of 
non-market forces in these contexts. While we recognize that there are differences across 
emerging markets, the three categories of institutional strategies identified here provide an 
important jumping off point for understanding these differences and their implications for 
organizations.  
Future research building on these concepts may address questions such as how and why 
particular institutional strategies are more (or less) effective across different emerging 
economies. For instance, one natural grouping under the broader emerging market umbrella is 			
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the distinction between the traditional developing economies and transition economies. A future 
line of research could examine the added challenges of implementing relational strategies in 
transition economies, wherein the previously closed nature of these economies has led most 
MNCs to have few links to business networks (Arnold & Quelch, 1998: 9).  Related to this, is the 
question of how legacies of past Socialist and Communist regimes continue to affect the 
competitive landscape facing organizations in transition economies – as opposed to traditional 
developing economies (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). As Figure 3 shows, there are a variety of 
different political systems, each of which could create another layer of difference across these 
contexts.  
  Along these lines, a crucial next step is to better define how the institutional capacity of 
an emerging economy to support corporate activity differs from that of more advanced 
economies.  While we created a baseline set of differences in Table 2, there is significant room 
for more specific questions. For example, how do the idiosyncratic institutions and conditions 
that shaped the development of firms from emerging and advanced economies shape their 
business activities and interaction patterns? Further, assuming that not all emerging economies 
follow Western-style patterns of economic development, how do differences in developmental 
trajectories affect the types of institutional strategies selected? Answering such questions will be 
important to understanding global competition moving forward – for globalization has opened up 
a “two-way street”, wherein businesses from advanced economies are not only expanding and 
diversifying into emerging markets, but businesses in emerging economies are also increasingly 
entering developed markets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Zhang, Duysters & Filippov, 2012).  Guillen 
and García-Canal (2009: 27) argue that multinationals from emerging economies may have a 
competitive advantage when expanding into other emerging economies – because they are “more 			
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used to dealing with discretionary and/or unstable governments in their home country, they are 
better prepared than the traditional MNEs to succeed in foreign countries characterized by a 
weak institutional environment.” We encourage future research that looks in more detail at the 
contrast between emerging and developed economies and the implications for organizational 
studies.  
For research on strategy and international business, a more comprehensive understanding 
of the unique sets of challenges and opportunities posed by emerging market contexts will allow 
for better informed decisions regarding partner selection, market entry mode, manufacturing 
location choices, product distribution channels, employee hiring and training policies, and so on. 
As globalization progresses, organizations need to understand and compete in institutionally-
diverse settings – requiring them to implement various institutional strategies to work with and 
shape relations with both internal and external actors; and, to gain knowledge of, and experience 
in, various local contexts. Such strategies are critical in mitigating uncertainty and stabilizing 
resource exchanges – especially in situations characterized by turbulent change, social 
instability, and frequent government interventions.  Next steps in this stream of research may 
include investigations into how the strategy formulation and implementation processes of 
organizations operating in emerging markets differ from those of organizations in developed 
markets.  
For research on entrepreneurship in emerging economy markets, appreciating the diverse 
institutional strategies available for navigating demographic and socio-cultural challenges is 
important for understanding how entrepreneurs not only gain access to critical start-up capital 
and resources, but also attend to marginally-developed market, regulatory, technological and 
physical infrastructures. Recent studies, for example, have shown that property protection and 			
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intellectual property rights regulations are “essential to entrepreneurship” in developed market 
economies (Puffer et al., 2010: 443). Yet, in emerging economies, such regulations may be 
missing or underdeveloped. As a consequence, entrepreneurs in these contexts have had to rely 
more heavily on specific relational and infrastructure building strategies, such as developing 
informal connections to local government officials and accessing informal sources of credit 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Nee, 1992; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Finally, for research on marketing, understanding the distinct institutional landscape of 
emerging market economies is critical for identifying customer tastes and preferences, customer 
characteristics and buying habits, as well as branding requirements (Arnold & Quelch, 1998; 
Melewar et al., 2006). However, developing such an understanding may be difficult due to a lack 
of reliable market research data and the rapidly changing social and demographic climate. To 
overcome these challenges will likely require dynamic and continuous monitoring of the 
marketplace, and a creative use of indicators to serve as “surrogates for assessing demand” 
(Arnold & Quelch, 1998: 14). Alternatively, London and Hart (2004) suggest that collaborating 
with non-traditional partners (e.g. non-profit organizations and community groups), co-inventing 
custom solutions from the bottom-up, and developing local capacity can provide MNCs with 
information on the local context, legitimacy, and access to needed resources. 
Overall, the above sets out new research directions aimed to promote cross-disciplinary 
dialogue, and to explore how organizations strategically navigate and manage the increasing 
complexities of their institutional environments. We encourage further research on emerging 
economies that integrates different theoretical lenses – as a means to better understand how these 
important contexts shed new light on existing organizational theories as well as conventional 
wisdom in academic thinking (c.f. Wright et al., 2005).   			
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Institutional Theory:  A New Frontier 
Our conceptualization of institutional strategies also has important contributions to 
defining a new frontier of research on institutional theories.  As globalization proceeds and 
emerging markets continue their remarkable growth trajectory, institutional theory has 
increasingly been drawn upon to provide crucial insights into the affects of institutional variation 
on organizational behavior and performance (Greenwood et al., 2011). Strategy scholars, for 
example, have underscored the importance of both understanding and adapting to institutional 
variations (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng et al., 2008) – yet, the implication of our review is 
that organizations may need to undertake a greater variety of strategies to align their practices 
and operations with different host country contexts (Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
Such a shift requires movement away from top down, passive conceptualizations of 
institutions to a more bottom-up interactive perspective that recognizes that organizations must 
be strategic in shaping their external contexts. And, while a long-standing criticism of 
institutional theory is its inability to explain endogenous change and agentive behavior, several 
streams of research have emerged to address this concern – e.g. institutional entrepreneurship 
(Battilana, et al, 2009), cultural entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), and institutional 
work (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011). Research from the institutional logics perspective, for 
instance, typically adopts a dynamic constructionist stance, wherein actors exposed to 
heterogeneous institutional arrangements have the “reflective capacity to innovate and create 
institutional change” (Thornton et al., 2012: 110). These newer streams of research have 
provided important insights into the “paradox of embedded agency,” addressing how 
organizations maintain their existing position in current institutional structures, whilst managing 			
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and building upon the institutions around them (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Hargadon & 
Douglas, 2001).   
In this review, we adopted a slightly different approach by highlighting a more interactive 
view of institutional processes that complements traditional perspectives.  Because the prior 
literatures on which we built have not typically been considered under the institutional theory 
ambit, they have not been shaped by implicit assumptions that actors are constrained in their 
institutional actions. In reviewing and synthesizing these cognate literatures, our intention was to 
identify the agentic and intent-driven nature of organizational strategies, which help shape and 
construct their institutional contexts.   
Our focus on emerging economy contexts drew attention to two key areas for future 
research. First, we highlighted the need for a greater appreciation of the institutionally-diverse 
contexts confronting organizations. To effectively compete and survive in today’s complex and 
globally-integrated market economy, organizations must not only be able to identify the unique 
sets of opportunities and challenges within these diverse contexts, but also attend to the 
idiosyncratic socio-political and cultural issues that characterize them. In many ways, our 
theoretical toolkits have been dominated by observations of, and insights derived from, 
developed market contexts – leading them to be somewhat misaligned with the current reality 
facing corporations. In order to keep pace with the current reality, we need to be open to 
challenging long-standing assumptions, testing existing theories, and developing new theories to 
account for the diversity of the global market. We, thus, echo Scott’s (2005) call for more 
institutional research examining non-Western cases – as part of a broader effort to test the 
generalizability of extant models and theories.  			
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Second, our review revealed the need for more dynamic conceptual models of the 
institutional pressures exerted on organizations. For the most part, current institutional theorizing 
has been grounded in rather static “snapshots” of a particular organizational or industry context 
over a relatively short period of time (Davis, 2010). Such snapshots may be inappropriate, or 
worse, misleading, when applied to emerging economies – which are characterized by fast-paced 
turbulent change. We, thus, suggest the need to develop dynamic strategy repertoires that enable 
organizations to learn, reconfigure, and adapt strategies in response to rapidly changing 
conditions (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Wright et al., 2005). In doing so, we echo Tilcsik (2010), 
who argues that future research should examine organizational “responses and the actors who 
implement them	 in motion, exploring how responses are formulated, contested, and altered over 
time” (p. 1493, emphasis original).  
In advocating this new frontier of institutional scholarship, we aim to highlight the 
importance of collaboration and discussion across disciplines, and the need to appreciate the 
myriad of institutional landscapes that organizations currently face. Thus, while our review 
focused on institutional strategizing in emerging economy contexts, we believe the insights 
generated herein have broader applicability for theorizing about advanced economies – and for 
building institutional theory more generally. For example, insights regarding the effectiveness of 
a particular institutional strategy in emerging economies may be generalizable to developed 
economies under various conditions – such as a partnership or collaboration between firms from 
both contexts, and the management of global supply chain relationships. Moreover, as the global 
economy becomes more integrated and the conditions in emerging economies move closer to 
those of advanced economies, organizations’ repertoires of institutional strategies are likely to 
evolve and possibly converge – blurring the lines between strategies tailored for emerging and 			
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developed economy contexts. This, however, is an empirical question that requires further 
research to confirm.  
Finally, we propose that the categories of institutional strategies that we identified from 
research on emerging economies – relational, infrastructure-building and socio-cultural bridging 
– may be usefully applied to advanced economies. For companies operating in advanced 
economies must also develop a repertoire of institutional strategies for navigating their socio-
cultural and political institutions. We encourage further cross-fertilization of research from 
emerging and developed market contexts – as a means to build more general and practical 
theory.  
Conclusion 
By bringing together diverse streams of research under the umbrella of ‘institutional 
strategies’, we draw attention to a number of important research opportunities.  The core 
contribution of this article is that it maps the field of research on institutional strategies, and 
highlights potential avenues for future research. As our review showed, there is a biased 
selection and focus in current research – namely, a disproportionate emphasis on developed 
markets. This raises some concern regarding the applicability of current models and theoretical 
toolkits in the context of emerging markets. To address this concern, we offer up a 
comprehensive framework of institutional strategies that not only provides a more realistic 
account of the diverse institutional conditions that organizations confront, but also highlights the 
importance of expanding the current focus from developed markets to a more global perspective. 
Our hope is that by outlining future research directions and raising provocative research 
questions, our review will encourage scholars to challenge and test existing theories, and to 
engage in more fruitful cross-disciplinary dialogue.  			
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Figure 1: 
World GDP Trends for Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
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Source: International Monetary Fund, April 2014 World Economic Outlook Database  
* GDP based on PPP share of world Total 
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Figure 2 
Average GDP Growth and Average GDP Per Capita of Major Countries of the World 
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Figure 3 
Emerging Markets By Political Regime Type 
 
 
NOTE:  Countries classified based on the “POLITY score,” a scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polity_data_series. Autocracy = -10 to -6; Closed Anocracy = -5 to 0; Open Anocracy = 1 to 5; Democracy = 6 to 9; Full Democracy 
– 10.  An anocracy is defined as “a regime-type where power is not vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups who are constantly competing 
with each other for power.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anocracy)
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Table 1 
Emerging Markets Identified by Major Investment Classification Sources 
 
Country IMF
a FTSE
b MSCI
c S&P
d Dow 
Jones
e  Russell
f 
Argentina  ●  ● 
Brazil  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Bulgaria  ● 
Chile  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
China  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Colombia  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Czech 
Republic   
●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Egypt  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Estonia  ● 
Greece  ●  ● 
Hungary  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
India  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Indonesia  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Latvia  ● 
Lithuania  ● 
Malaysia  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Mexico  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Morocco  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Pakistan  ●  ● 
Peru  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Philippines  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Poland  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Romania  ● 
Russia  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
South Africa  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
South Korea  ●  ●  ● 
Taiwan  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Thailand  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Turkey  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Ukraine  ● 
UAE  ●  ● 
Venezuela  ● 
 
a = See IMF World Economic Outlook Update http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/02/index.htm 
b = See FTSE Country Classification, September 2010 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/Downloads/Sept%202010/FTSE_Country_Classification_Sept_2010_Update.pdf 
c =  See MSCI Emerging markets list http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/international_equity_indices 
d = The S&P Global Broad Market Index, 31 December 2010, p. 2. 
https://www.sp-indexdata.com/idpfiles/citigroup/prc/active/factsheets/Factsheet_SP_Global_BMI.pdf 
e = See Dow Jones Indexes Country Classification System 
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/brochure_info/Dow_Jones_Indexes_Country_Classification_System.pdf 
f = See Russell Global Indexes - Construction and Methodology 
http://www.russell.com/documents/indexes/construction-methodology-global-indexes.pdf 
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Table 2 
Key Differences Between Developed and Emerging Markets on Economic and Institutional 
Dimensions 
 
 
  
Developed Markets 
 
Emerging Markets 
Implications for 
Operating in EMs 
Economic 
Conditions 
 Developed capital markets 
with moderate to high 
levels of liquidity  
 ‘Meaningful’ regulatory 
bodies 
 Large market 
capitalization 
 High levels of per capita 
income 
 Dominance of industrial 
and service sector 
 Large-scale production of 
commodities 
 Minimal trade barriers 
 Low GDP growth rates 
 Marginally developed capital 
markets with low levels of 
market liquidity  
 Low levels of per capita 
income and high income 
inequality 
 Rapid economic growth and 
development  
 Volatility in financial capital 
inflows 
 High levels of inflation 
 Modernization of 
infrastructure as the economy 
moves from a dependence on 
agriculture to manufacturing 
 Dominance of manufacturing 
and labor-intensive industries
 Decreasing trade barriers 
 High GDP growth rates
 Increased transaction 
costs 
 Market vulnerabilities to 
large macroeconomic and 
political instabilities 
 Rampant opportunistic 
behavior, bribery, and 
corruption 
 High potential for growth 
and investment 
 Growing consumer base 
with discretionary income 
Institutional 
Conditions 
(political, 
legal, socio-
cultural, 
technological) 
 Formal regulatory 
infrastructure in place (e.g. 
market regulation, 
corporate governance, 
transparency and 
accounting standards) 
 Moderate to high standard 
of living 
 Moderate to high Human 
Development Index (HDI) 
levels (education, literacy, 
and health) 
 Advanced technological 
and commercial 
infrastructure 
 High degree of political 
freedom 
 Little government 
intervention in business 
 Non-transparent political and 
regulatory environment 
 Young population and 
expanding working 
population 
 Increasing urbanization 
 Burgeoning middle class 
 Growing demand for 
consumer goods and 
infrastructure development 
 Prevalence of state-owned 
firms 
 Low to moderate degree of 
political freedom 
 Moderate to high levels of 
government intervention in 
business 
 Constraints on types of 
activities organizations 
can engage in 
 Limited property rights 
and intellectual property 
protection 
 Underdeveloped physical 
and commercial 
infrastructure 
 Lack of availability of 
skilled labor and/or 
expertise 
 Ideologically-fuelled 
political and social unrest 
 Risk of government 
intervention and 
expropriation 
 Importance of informal 
networks and 
relationships 
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Table 3 
Types of Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets  
 
 
Institutional Strategy Types 
and Definitions 
Importance in Emerging Markets 
Relational Strategies: The 
actions and activities taken to 
interact with and strategically 
manage important referent 
audiences, including political 
bodies and key stakeholder groups. 
  Cultivate interpersonal networks and social capital as 
‘substitutes’ for weak market structures and 
underdeveloped regulatory and legal infrastructures 
  Engage in political strategies focused on furthering 
organizational self-interests instead of directly influencing 
public policy – e.g. government subsidies and tax 
exemptions, access to key factors of production and 
valuable natural resources, etc. 
  Leverage informal connections and relationships to reduce 
uncertainty, protect private property, and regulate social 
behavior 
Infrastructure-Building 
Strategies: The actions and 
activities taken to address 
marginally developed markets, and 
underdeveloped social, 
technological, and physical 
infrastructures.   
  Engage in collective organizing to pursue and promote 
infrastructure development  
  Develop informal mechanisms and standardization 
strategies for addressing ‘institutional voids’ 
  Develop or promote global standards to foster a common 
language and understanding of business practices and 
outcomes  
Socio-cultural Bridging 
Strategies: The actions and 
activities taken to address the 
socio-cultural and demographic 
issues/challenges, which shape the 
competitive environment. 
  Develop knowledge and experience of local conditions and 
features – e.g. partnering with local firms, hiring local 
senior managers and consultants, investing in field 
investigations, learning from local competitors, and 
building local talent and capacity 
  Recognize that the legacies of past political regimes may 
continue to shape the business environment, particularly in 
transition economies – e.g. excess physical and human 
resources, strong societal expectations for organizations act 
as ‘mini welfare states’, etc. 
 